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I. Introduction 
 
Renewables portfolio standards (RPS) have – since the late 1990s – proliferated at the state level 
in the United States.  What began as a policy idea minted in California and first described in 
detail in the pages of the Electricity JournalTPF1FPT has emerged as an important driver for renewable 
energy capacity additions in the United States.  Over the years, articles in the Electricity Journal 
have explored the RPS in more detail, identifying both its strengths and weaknesses.TPF2FPT    
 
The present article provides an introduction to the history, concept, and design of the RPS, 
reviews early experience with the policy as applied at the state level, and provides a brief 
overview of Federal RPS proposals to date and the possible relationship between Federal and 
state RPS policies.  Our purpose is to offer a factual introduction to the RPS, as applied and 
considered in the U.S. Though elements of state RPS design are summarized here, other 
publications provide a more thorough review of design lessons that emerge from that 
experience.TPF3FPT  In addition, the present article does not describe the results of economic analyses of 
Federal RPS proposals, though we do cite many of the analyses conducted by the U.S. DOE’s 
Energy Information Administration (EIA).     
 
II. History and Current Application 
 
The design of an RPS may vary, but at its heart an RPS requires electricity suppliers (or, 
alternatively, electricity generators or consumers) to source a certain quantity (in percentage, 
megawatt-hour, or megawatt terms) of renewable energy.  Many – but not all – such policies 
include the trading of renewable energy certificates. 
 
Discussions of the detailed design of an RPS first began in California in 1995.TPF4FPT  Though 
California chose not to implement an RPS at that time (California later did so, in 2002), the clean 
                                                 
TP
1
PT Rader, Nancy, and Richard Norgaard. “Efficiency and Sustainability in Restructured Electric Markets: The 
Renewables Portfolio Standard.” The Electricity Journal, July 1996.   
TP
2
PT See: (1) Bernow, Steve, William Dougherty, and Max Duckworth.  “Can We Afford a Renewables Portfolio 
Standard?” The Electricity Journal, May 1997. (2) Haddad, Brent, and Paul Jefferiss. “Forging Consensus on 
National Renewables Policy: The Renewables Portfolio Standard and the National Public Benefits Trust Fund.” The 
Electricity Journal, March 1999. (3) Wiser, Ryan, Kevin Porter, and Steve Clemmer. “Emerging Markets for 
Renewable Energy: The Role of State Policies during Restructuring.” The Electricity Journal, January/February 
2000. (4) Chupka, Marc. “Designing Effective Renewable Markets.” The Electricity Journal, May 2003. (5) Wiser, 
Ryan, Kevin Porter, Mark Bolinger, and Heather Raitt. “Does It Have To Be This Hard? Implementing the Nation’s 
Most Complex Renewables Portfolio Standard.” The Electricity Journal, October 2005. (6) Ferrey, Steven. 
“Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level.” The Electricity Journal, March 
2006. (7)  Berendt, Christopher. “A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid National Market for Renewable 
Energy Certificates: the REC-EX Model.” The Electricity Journal, June 2006. (8) Sovacool, Benjamin, and 
Christopher Cooper. “Green Means ‘Go’ – A Colorful Approach to a U.S. National Renewable Portfolio Standard.” 
The Electricity Journal, August/September 2006. 
TP
3
PT See, e.g., Ryan, Kevin Porter, and Robert Grace. “Evaluating Experience with Renewables Portfolio Standards in 
the United States.” LBNL-54439, March 2004. HTUhttp://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/54439.pdfUTH.  
TP
4
PT See: (1) Gregg Morris, Ryan Wiser, and Steven Pickle, eds.  “Renewables Working Group to the California Public 
Utilities Commission.” CPUC No. 500-96-008, August 1996. (2) Wiser, Ryan, Steven Pickle, and Charles Goldman.  
“Renewable Energy Policy and Electricity Restructuring: A California Case Study.”  Energy Policy, September 
1998.  RPS policies in Minnesota and Iowa predated the discussions in California, but these two renewable energy 
mandates were only later labeled as RPS policies.    
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energy advocacy community quickly picked up the concept.  Initially, state RPS policies were 
generally incorporated into much broader state electricity restructuring legislation.  More 
recently, however, state RPS policies have been adopted through stand-alone legislation.  The 
RPS is sometimes viewed by policy-makers as a “market-friendly” way of ensuring that a 
minimum amount of renewable energy deployment will be achieved, and is a widely used policy 
(relative to other renewable energy policy mechanisms) in part because an RPS does not 
typically require an explicit allocation of governmental funding.  Though most state RPS policies 
have been enacted through legislation, two have been established through regulatory channels 
(Arizona and New York) and two through voter-approved initiatives (Colorado and 
Washington).TPF5FPT 
 
Figure 1 shows the rate of state RPS adoption over time, presenting both the year of initial 
enactment and the years in which major changes to state RPS policies have been made.  Where 
changes have been made, with few exceptions, these legislative changes have been to strengthen 
RPS requirements; no state RPS policy has yet been repealed by later legislative action.  Today, 
21 states and the District of Columbia have mandatory RPS obligations (Figure 2).  These 
policies cover roughly 40% of total U.S. electrical load, and have been implemented in both 
restructured electricity markets and in cost-of-service-regulated markets.  In addition to these 
mandatory policies, voluntary renewable energy standards exist in Iowa, Illinois, Vermont, and 
Maine.TPF6FPT 
 
Source:  Union of Concerned Scientists; revised by Berkeley Lab 
Figure 1. The Adoption and Revision of State RPS Policies 
                                                 
TP
5
PT The Colorado RPS initially passed based on a voter initiative in 2004, with 53% support.  The Washington state 
RPS passed in 2006 with 52% of the vote.  In both cases, relatively narrow majorities supported the state RPS. 
TP
6
PT Maine’s RPS contains both a mandatory and voluntary component.  
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Source:  Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
Figure 2.  State RPS Policies (March 2007)  
 
The RPS is not solely a U.S. phenomenon.  Similar policies, variously called Quotas, 
Renewables Obligations, or Tradeable Green Certificate programs, now exist in – at a minimum 
– the United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Japan, and Australia.  Most of these 
policies have been established since 2000, so experience is scant.  Though detailed information 
on these policies is not offered in the pages that follow, early international experience matches 
(to some degree) that in the U.S. in that a variety of RPS designs are in place, and experience 
with those designs has been mixed, with some policies resulting in relatively high-cost renewable 
energy additions and/or limited impacts on the renewable energy marketplace.TPF7FPT 
 
III. The Mechanics and Design of an RPS 
 
For the purpose of this article, we define an RPS as a requirement that retail electricity suppliers 
procure a certain minimum quantity of eligible renewable energy or capacity, measured in either 
absolute units (kWh or kW) or as a percentage share of retail sales.  RPS policies are generally 
designed to maintain and/or increase the contribution of renewable energy to the electricity 
supply mix.  The RPS establishes numeric targets for renewable energy supply, applies those 
targets to retail electricity suppliers, and seeks to encourage competition among renewable 
developers to meet the targets in a least-cost fashion.  RPS purchase obligations generally 
increase over time, and retail suppliers typically must demonstrate compliance on an annual 
basis. These requirements are often backed with some form of penalty if compliance is not 
achieved. 
 
Many RPS programs utilize tradable renewable energy certificates (RECs) to increase the 
flexibility and reduce the cost of compliance with the purchase mandate, and to facilitate 
                                                 
TP
7
PT See, for example, van der Linden, Nico, et al. “Review of International Experience with Renewable Energy 
Obligation Support Mechanisms.” ECN-C—05-025, May 2005. HTUhttp://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/57666.pdfUTH. 
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compliance tracking. A REC is created when a megawatt-hour of renewable energy is generated, 
is a purely financial product, and can be traded separately from the underlying electricity 
generation. REC transactions create a supplemental revenue stream for renewable generators, 
and allow retail suppliers to demonstrate compliance with the RPS by purchasing RECs in lieu of 
directly purchasing renewable electricity.  
 
Though the concept appears simple and direct in theory, in practice, RPS designs vary 
substantially from one another; so much so, that there is some debate over what exactly 
constitutes an RPS, and whether certain states qualify as having an RPS.  Illinois, for example, 
has established voluntary renewable energy targets; New York has established a policy that it 
calls an RPS, but that involves ratepayer collection of funds and incentive payments from a state 
energy authority.  Above we have identified New York as a state with an RPS, and Illinois as one 
without such a policy: we readily acknowledge that such classifications are subject to debate.  
 
A subset of the numerous types of policy variations possible in RPS program design are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  RPS Policy Design Options 
Structure, Size, and Application Eligibility Administration 
• Basis (energy vs. capacity 
obligation) 
• Purchase obligations over time 
• Structure (single tier or multiple 
tiers) 
• Resource diversity requirements 
or incentives 
• Start date 
• Duration of obligation (sunset 
provisions) 
• Application to retail suppliers, and 
exemptions from obligation 
• Product- or company-based 
application 
 
• Geographic eligibility 
• Resource  eligibility  
• Eligibility of existing 
renewable generation 
• Definition of new/ 
incremental generation 
• Treatment of multi-fuel 
facilities 
• Treatment of off-grid and 
customer-sited facilities 
• Regulatory oversight body(ies) 
• Compliance verification (RECs, or 
otherwise) 
• Certification of eligible generators 
• Compliance filing requirements 
• Enforcement mechanisms 
• Cost caps and alternative compliance 
payments 
• Flexibility mechanisms (banking, 
borrowing, etc.) 
• Contracting standards for regulated retail 
suppliers 
• Cost recovery for regulated retail 
suppliers 
• Interactions with other energy and 
environmental policies 
Source:  Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
 
Structure, Size, and Application 
 
RPS policies may vary significantly in basic program structure, size, and application.  Perhaps 
the most common targets establish a periodic (often annual) schedule that specifies the share of 
electricity sales that must be accounted for by eligible renewable resources.  In other cases, 
targets might be based on absolute generation or installed capacity.  Some policies or proposals 
contain a “sunset” date, after which the requirement is assumed to expire.  “Tiered” targets 
establish different resource-eligibility requirements for two or more sets of renewable energy 
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purchase targets, frequently with different schedules and compliance frameworks.TPF8FPT  Tiers are 
often used to ensure that an RPS provides support to not just the least-cost renewable energy 
options, but also to certain “preferred” resources such as solar power.  For a variety of reasons, 
RPS policies sometimes provide exemptions for certain suppliers, often including municipal 
utilities and rural electric co-operatives; still other policies might exempt certain customers from 
meeting RPS obligations.    
 
Eligibility 
 
Although the generic term “renewable” is used to describe RPS policies, there is not universal 
agreement about eligible resources.  Wind, solar, geothermal, landfill-gas, and ocean-based 
energy resources are typically eligible to meet RPS obligations in jurisdictions where such 
resources are available.  There is often less agreement, however, on the eligibility of biomass, 
municipal solid waste (MSW) incineration, and hydro-electric resources.  Qualified biomass or 
MSW is sometimes limited to certain technologies and fuel types, for example, while 
hydropower may be subject to qualification based on facility size, age, or design (such as run-of-
river or storage projects).  Some policies may allow select non-renewable generation to meet a 
portion of policy targets, or even allow non-generation actions – such as energy efficiency 
programs – to earn credit toward meeting the target.  Whether existing renewable sources are 
eligible to meet RPS obligations may also vary, as might the geographic location of eligible 
generators and the requirements of those generators to deliver electricity locally.  
 
Administration 
 
Though RPS requirements typically apply to retail electricity suppliers,TPF9FPT they can have varying 
degrees of flexibility in how a given company can acquire renewable generation.  REC trading is 
commonly allowed, and banking and borrowing of RECs may be accepted.  RECs may often be 
purchased through long-term contracts, shorter-term contracts, or through spot purchases, and 
some RPS policies provide oversight of utility compliance and contracting decisions.  Cost-of-
service regulated utilities are expected to recover any excess costs through standard rate-making 
proceedings.  Where retail competition is allowed, cost-recovery is somewhat less certain, but 
any excess costs are likely to be passed on to electricity consumers.  In some jurisdictions, the 
government absorbs some or all of the excess costs, sometimes from dedicated funds derived 
from a surcharge on electricity service.  Cost caps of various types are often employed to ensure 
limits to the cost of RPS compliance.  There is a wide variety of mechanisms that can be used to 
enforce RPS requirements, such as electricity license revocation or civil fines.  In addition, RPS 
policies might allow for compliance without actual renewable generation through provisions 
such as alternative compliance payments, statutory waivers, and discretionary waivers.   
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
8
PT In some cases, excess compliance toward the policy-preferred tier may be used to satisfy secondary tier 
requirements, but compliance from the secondary tier is not generally allowed to satisfy compliance in the policy-
preferred tier. 
TP
9
PT Also referred to as “load serving entities,” “regulated utilities,” “electricity retailers,” “electricity service 
providers,” or other terms referring to the entity responsible for end-use electricity sales 
  6
IV. State RPS Experience and Expectations 
 
A. Policy Design and Early Experience 
 
RPS policies share the common goal of encouraging renewable energy supply, but there are 
many variations in the scope, nature, and design of existing state RPS requirements, reflecting 
the diversity of design choices discussed earlier.  The tailoring of RPS designs to satisfy 
particular state objectives and political exigencies is a typical aspect of state policy making, 
making U.S. states ‘laboratories’ for RPS policy experimentation.   
 
The renewable energy purchase obligations, for example, range from 2% to 30% of retail sales. 
Though wind, solar, landfill-gas, and geothermal energy are eligible under most of the policies, 
criteria for the eligibility of biomass and hydropower varies considerably across states. Some 
states allow sources such as energy efficiency and gas-fired fuel cells to qualify, although many 
would not consider these to be, strictly speaking, renewable.  RPS obligations typically fall on 
investor-owned electric utilities and, where they exist, competitive energy service providers; the 
treatment of publicly-owned utilities varies, but exemptions are common.   
 
Differences also exist with respect to the duration of the policies, whether additional technology 
bands exist to support solar power or other higher-cost resources, how out-of-state renewable 
generators are handled, whether existing renewable plants are eligible, what kind of enforcement 
is applied, what level of compliance flexibility is allowed, and the role of state funding. Most of 
the states have developed or are developing REC markets to ease compliance burdens, though 
the geographic scope of those markets as well as the definition of a REC varies; cross-market 
REC liquidity is therefore limited.TPF10FPT Electronic REC tracking systems are now in place in Texas, 
New England, the PJM Interconnection and Wisconsin, and are being developed in the Midwest, 
West, and New York.  Finally, many of the state RPS programs have various combinations and 
types of cost-caps, force majeure clauses, or other provisions for discretionary or non-
discretionary regulatory waivers. 
 
Table 2 illustrates a small subset of the important design differences that exist among existing 
state RPS programs.  
                                                 
TP
10
PT It is worth mentioning that RECs may also be sold on a voluntary basis outside of RPS markets to meet the needs 
of the customer-driven green power market.  
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Table 2. State RPS Design Variations  
State Original 
Start 
Date 
Current 
Ultimate 
Target 
Existing 
Plants 
Eligible* 
Technology Bands or Tiers 
Arizona 2001 15% (2025) No Yes (Distributed Generation) 
California 2003 20% (2010) Yes No 
Colorado 2007 20% (2020) Yes Yes (Solar) 
Connecticut 2000 10% (2010) Yes Yes (Class I/II Technologies) 
Delaware 2007 10% (2019) Yes  Yes (Vintage) 
Hawaii 2005 20% (2020) Yes No 
Iowa 1999 ~2% (1999) Yes No 
Maine 2000 30% (2000) Yes No 
Maryland 2006 7.5% (2019) Yes  Yes (Class I/II Technologies) 
Massachusetts 2003 4% (2009) No No 
Minnesota 2002 25-30% (2020-25) Yes Yes (Wind/Other for Xcel) 
Montana 2008 15% (2015) No Yes (Community Wind) 
Nevada 2001 20% (2015) Yes Yes (Solar) 
New Jersey 2001 22.5% (2021) Yes Yes (Solar, Class I/II Technologies) 
New Mexico 2006 20% (2020) Yes No 
New York 2006 24% (2013) Yes Yes (Distributed Generation) 
Pennsylvania 2001 8% (2020) Yes Yes (Solar) 
Rhode Island 2007 16% (2020) Yes Yes (Vintage) 
Texas 2002 ~4.2% (2015) Yes  Yes (Goal, Non-Wind) 
Washington 2012 15% (2020) No No 
Washington DC 2007 11% (2022) Yes Yes (Solar, Class I/II Technologies) 
Wisconsin 2000 10% (2015) Yes No 
*  In some cases, RPS policies allow existing facilities built after a certain date, e.g., 1999.  We list these states as 
not allowing existing resources in this table because they do not allow older existing facilities.  
Source: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
 
Importantly, while the number of states that have created RPS policies is large, experience with 
these policies remains somewhat limited; few of the states have more than five years of 
experience with their programs, and some of the policies have been established but have not yet 
taken effect. Not surprisingly, however, the diversity in policy design among states has already 
led to a range of experiences (and lessons learned) with the operations of an RPS.  
 
Some programs appear to have stimulated significant renewable development, and at relatively 
low cost, while others have not.  In some states, such as Texas, for example, RPS policies appear 
to have significantly contributed to new renewable energy additions.  In other cases, including 
Massachusetts, Nevada, Arizona, New York, and California, it appears as if renewable energy 
deliveries are not currently on track to meet mandated targets for actual renewable generation.TPF11FPT  
And in still other cases – Maine being the most obvious example – RPS programs are largely 
supporting existing, not new, renewable generation. 
 
As experience is gained with this policy instrument, some have noted concerns over policy 
implementation, including:  
 
                                                 
TP
11
PT This does not necessarily mean that the state’s electricity utilities will be subject to penalties for lack of 
compliance, as cost caps, flexibility mechanisms, and force majeure clauses have so far excused most suppliers from 
being penalized. 
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• uncertainty in the duration or design of the policy;  
• renewable energy targets and eligibility rules that in some cases do not require significant 
levels of new renewable energy development;  
• unclear or inadequate enforcement of the policy;  
• RPS obligations that may be too aggressive to be achieved in some instances;  
• extensive exemptions from the purchase mandate;  
• inadequate compliance flexibility;  
• lack of sufficient standards for long-term contracting, and short-term REC markets that 
are too uncertain to support long-term financing;  
• cost caps and force majeure clauses that are lenient enough to make full compliance 
unlikely; and  
• lack of an adequate mechanism to proactively plan transmission to renewable resource 
rich areas.TPF12FPT   
 
Many of these concerns center on the possibility that certain policy designs may weaken the RPS 
as a vehicle for promoting new renewable generation.  However, concerns have also been 
expressed about the possibility of excess costs, the allocation of costs and risks, electricity 
reliability, and the possibility of other undesired or unintended outcomes.  Clearly, RPS design is 
a complex process, and the details of that design are crucial to the ability of the policy to achieve 
the stated goals of encouraging increasing renewable energy supply.   
 
B. Impacts on Renewable Energy Supply 
 
State RPS policies are but one of a number of drivers for renewable energy capacity expansion.  
Other significant motivators include Federal and state tax incentives, state renewable energy 
funds, state integrated resource plans, voluntary green power markets, and the economic 
competitiveness of renewable energy relative to other generation options.  Disentangling these 
various drivers is – to put it mildly – challenging.  This task is further complicated by the fact 
that experience with state RPS policies remains somewhat limited. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, Black and Veatch estimates that roughly half of the new renewable 
capacity additions in the United States from the late 1990s through 2006 have occurred in states 
with RPS policies, totaling nearly 5,500 MW.  Over 90% of these capacity additions have come 
from wind power, but biomass and geothermal have also played a role.  Because of technology 
tiers that exist in a number of states (see Table 2), a growing amount of solar energy is also being 
buttressed by these obligations.  The EIA, meanwhile, estimates that 7,300 MW of new 
renewable capacity was added to the 21 states with RPS obligations and purchase mandates, 
from each state’s date of program enactment through the end of 2006.TPF13FPT   
 
                                                 
TP
12
PT See, e.g., (1) Wiser, Ryan, Kevin Porter, and Robert Grace. “Evaluating Experience with Renewables Portfolio 
Standards in the United States.” LBNL-54439, March 2004. HTUhttp://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/54439.pdfUTH. (2) Rader, 
Nancy, and Scott Hempling. “The Renewables Portfolio Standard: A Practical Guide.”  Prepared for the National 
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, February 2001. 
TP
13
PT This estimate excludes Washington, DC, which has an RPS policy, but minimal renewable generation capacity, 
and Washington state, which passed its RPS initiative at the end of 2006. 
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These estimates should be viewed with some caution.  They track bulk non-hydro renewable 
energy capacity installations, without confirmation that any given facility was constructed 
because of a state RPS or was, in fact, even eligible for a given state’s RPS.  Further 
complicating the estimation is that some states allow out-of-state generation to count toward 
their RPS requirements, so renewable capacity built in a non-RPS state may be used to meet 
another state’s mandate.  In fact, significant renewable installations have occurred in states 
without RPS programs.   
 
One cannot therefore claim that all of this capacity was uniquely and solely motivated by state 
RPS programs – federal tax policy has played a particularly important role.  Research at 
Berkeley Lab, however, suggest that, between 2001 and 2006, over 50% of the total wind 
additions in the U.S. were motivated, at least in part, by these state RPS policies. Furthermore, 
Menz et al. have shown a statistical relationship between state RPS policies and wind power 
development.TPF14FPT  
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Figure 3. Cumulative Non-Hydro Renewable Energy Capacity in the United States 
 
Many analysts expect these impacts to expand over time, though the magnitude of that growth 
depends on whether the RPS policies are implemented fully, whether cost caps are limiting, and 
whether new renewable energy projects would have come on line absent the support of state RPS 
policies.  Because of these complexities, a wide range of impact estimates has been offered.   
                                                 
TP
14
PT Menz, Fredric, and Stephan Vachon. “The Effectiveness of Different Policy Regimes for Promoting Wind Power: 
Experiences from the States.”  Energy Policy, 34, 2006. 
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The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), for example, has estimated that roughly 45 GW of 
new renewable energy capacity may be needed by 2020 to fully meet the existing state RPS 
policies. Global Energy Advisors sees upwards of 52 GW required by 2020 to meet these 
mandates.TPF15FPT  
 
In contrast, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has estimated that existing state 
policies, including most prominently state RPS programs, could result in just 8 – 12 GW of new 
wind capacity relative to a no-state-policy base case.TPF16FPT  These lower capacity estimates are a 
reflection of two important factors in the NREL analysis: (1) an assumption that significant 
renewable energy capacity additions would occur even absent state RPS policies, and (2) an 
assumption that cost caps will limit the impacts of some of the state RPS policies. 
 
Using an approach somewhat similar to that used by NREL, the EIA estimates that some regions 
with existing state RPS programs could see substantially more renewable electricity generation 
than is projected in the AEO2007 reference case.TPF17FPT State standards in the Mid-Atlantic and New 
England regions could result in approximately 350% and 20% more renewable generation by 
2030, respectively, than projected in the reference case. Though the total increase in renewable 
generation in New York is expected to be just over 10% by 2030, generation from non-hydro 
renewable resources would nearly double compared to the reference case.  In other regions, the 
impact of the standards is projected by the EIA to be less pronounced, as these regions have 
either already largely met their renewable electricity requirements with existing and planned 
capacity or are projected to build sufficient renewable capacity based on economic merits alone 
even without an RPS policy. In aggregate, the EIA estimates that existing state RPS policies 
could result in over 30% more electricity generation from non-hydropower renewables in 2030 
than is projected in the AEO2007 reference case, with new installed renewable capacity of 
almost 20,000 MW relative to 2006 capacity, or about 10,000 MW more than the reference case.  
 
Though the market impacts of existing state RPS policies is somewhat uncertain, there is little 
doubt that the aggregate amount of new renewable energy generation required under these 
policies is significant, at least when compared to recent industry growth.  That said, even taking 
one of the higher estimates provided by UCS, the amount of additional renewable energy 
generation required under existing state RPS programs equates to just 3% of total 2020 electric 
sales in the U.S., roughly doubling the percentage of non-hydro renewable energy generation 
currently serving the nation.  In this scenario, 16% of the roughly 900 TWh of demand growth 
expected by EIA from 2006 to 2020 would come from new renewable generation required under 
existing state RPS policies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
15
PT Knutson, Kent, and Peter McMahan. “Closing the Green Gap.” Public Utilities Fortnightly, April 2005. 
TP
16
PT Blair, Nate, Walter Short, Paul Denholm, and Donna Heimiller. “Long-Term National Impacts of State-Level 
Policies.” NREL-CP-620-40105, June 2006. HTUhttp://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy06osti/40105.pdf UTH.  
TP
17
PT See the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2007, page 28.  HTUhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/leg_reg.pdfUTH.  
In this analysis, states are aggregated into electricity market regions, approximately corresponding to regions of the 
North American Electricity Reliability Council. 
  11
C. Cost Impacts  
 
State RPS policies could have substantial impacts on electricity markets, ratepayers, and local 
economies.  Unfortunately, the actual costs (and benefits) of state RPS policies have not been 
compiled in a comprehensive fashion, in part because of the early state of policy implementation 
and in part because of methodological complexities and data availability constraints.  
Nonetheless, it is reasonably clear that, to date at least, cost impacts of state RPS policies have 
varied substantially by state but, at the same time, there is little evidence of a sizable impact on 
average retail electricity rates in most instances.  
 
Figure 4 presents historical REC prices for those states in which RECs trade is sufficiently liquid 
to result in reasonably transparent transaction data.  These states are typically those in which 
both retail electric competition and liquid wholesale electricity markets exist.  Though not a 
comprehensive picture of all states, the figure clearly indicates that spot REC prices have varied 
substantially across regions and resource types, and that significant price fluctuations are 
possible even within a particular state over time.  
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Figure 4. Compliance REC prices in the USA 2002-2006 
 
                                                 
TP
18
PT The source of these data is Evolution Markets’ monthly REC pricing reports, as compiled by Berkeley Lab. 
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Some of this price variation can be explained by RPS design: the Maine and “Class II” 
requirements can be met entirely with existing renewable generation, suppressing REC prices, 
for example, while New Jersey’s solar RECs are costly due to the underlying cost of solar 
electricity. In other cases, the high price of RECs is caused by annual RPS-driven demand 
exceeding currently available renewables supply (e.g., Massachusetts).  Variations in REC prices 
across time are caused by many factors, including unpredicted policy changes affecting 
renewable energy supply and demand conditions (e.g., in Connecticut, policies have changed on 
the extent to which existing biomass generators are eligible under the RPS, creating significant 
REC price fluctuations). Weiss and others have suggested that widely fluctuating REC prices 
may be an inherent feature of RPS markets, resulting from a largely fixed demand for renewable 
energy (as established by the RPS) and limited short-term renewable energy supply flexibility.TPF19FPT  
Whatever the cause, these fluctuating prices have, in some cases, impeded renewable energy 
development because they offer unclear price signals to renewable energy investors about the 
attractiveness of development activity.  In fact, RPS policies appear to have experienced more 
renewable project development when applied in markets that still attract long-term power 
purchase agreements and therefore also long-term investment and financing.TPF20FPT 
 
Translating these REC prices, as well as the renewable electricity contracts that predominate in 
most other states not shown in Figure 4, into retail rate impacts is challenging.  Nonetheless, if 
one assumes that REC prices represent the incremental above-market cost of renewable energy, 
that the prices presented in Figure 4 are representative of all RECs used for RPS compliance, and 
that certain state-specific cost caps are binding, then these data translate into RPS-induced retail 
rate impacts in 2006 of: Maine (0.1%), Maryland (0.1%), New Jersey (0.1%), New York (0.1%), 
Connecticut (0.2%), Arizona (0.4%), and Massachusetts (1.1%).  These retail rate impacts will 
grow as RPS percentage obligations increase, unless REC prices simultaneously decline.  
 
In states where long-term renewable electricity contracts (not short-term trade in RECs) 
predominate as the mode of state RPS compliance, retail rate impacts are more difficult to 
estimate due to the confidentiality of contract terms and the challenges of associating 
transmission and integration costs to individual renewable energy purchases.  Nevertheless, the 
vast majority of new renewable energy contracts that have been inked in California since 2002 
(2,000 MW of the 2,140 MW of contracts that have been signed) have been signed at prices that 
are below the state’s market price referent – the calculated cost of new gas-fired generators.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests low renewable energy prices in New Mexico, Colorado, Minnesota, 
Texas, Montana, and Wisconsin as well.  In these instances, it is not clear whether state RPS 
policies are leading to higher, or lower, retail electricity prices, but lower prices are certainly 
possible.  That is, higher renewable technology costs may be offset by lower fuel and operations 
and maintenance (O&M) costs.  More analysis of these impacts is warranted.  
 
Another approach to estimating cost impacts is to review state RPS cost-impact projections.  
Though these are projections, and therefore embody numerous assumptions that will not be 
universally agreed upon, they may be useful in understanding potential long-term impacts, 
                                                 
TP
19
PT Weiss, Jurgen.  “Are REC Markets a WRECK Waiting to Happen?” NREL Energy Analysis Seminar.  February 
8, 2007.  HTUhttp://www.nrel.gov/analysis/seminar/pdfs/2007/ea_seminar_feb_8_p.pdfUTH.  
TP
20
PT See, e.g., Wiser, Ryan, Kevin Porter, and Robert Grace. “Evaluating Experience with Renewables Portfolio 
Standards in the United States.” LBNL-54439, March 2004. HTUhttp://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/54439.pdfUTH. 
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especially given the rising levels of renewable energy required by state RPS policies over time.  
Based on a review of 28 such studies, covering 18 states (not all of which have actually 
implemented a state RPS), Berkeley Lab has recently found that projected rate impacts are 
generally reasonably modest, but can be significant in some instances (see Figure 5).TP PTTPF21FPT  In 
particular, 70% of the state RPS cost studies in the Berkeley Lab sample forecast retail electricity 
rate increases of no greater than 1% in the year that each modeled RPS policy reaches its peak 
percentage target.  In six of these studies, state electricity consumers are projected to experience 
cost savings as a result of the RPS policies being modeled.  On the other extreme, nine studies 
predict rate increases above 1%, and two of these studies predict rate increases of more than 5%.   
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Figure 5.  Projected RPS Electricity Rate Impacts by Cost Study 
 
The EIA has also investigated the possible impacts of existing state RPS programs, on a regional 
basis. EIA projects modest electricity price impacts, both regionally and nationally; generally 
less than plus or minus 1%, relative to a no-state-RPS reference case, in a given year or region.TPF22FPT  
Whether the benefits of an RPS exceed these projected costs is subject to debate.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
21
PT Chen, Cliff, Ryan Wiser, and Mark Bolinger. “Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Renewables Portfolio 
Standards: A Comparative Analysis of State-Level Policy Impact Projections.” Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, LBNL-61580, March 2007. 
TP
22
PT EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2007. HTUhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/leg_reg.pdfUTH.   
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V. Federal RPS Proposals 
 
A. Federal Design Issues 
 
Congress has considered a number of Federal RPS proposals (and amendments) in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.  To date, no proposal has been passed by both 
houses.  The EIA has analyzed several of these proposals, including legislation sponsored by 
Senator Jeffords (10% RPS) TPF23FPT and Senator Bingaman (10% RPS) TPF24FPT prior to the current 
legislative session, and by Senator Coleman (20% “clean energy” portfolio standard) in the 
current session.TPF25FPT Bingaman’s original proposal, S.517, was introduced in March 2001 and was 
passed by the Senate in April 2002, and was substantially similar to a proposal, also from 
Senator Bingaman, which passed the Senate in 2005.   
 
All of the Federal RPS proposals have certain common design features, including: a renewable 
production target and schedule; a range of qualifying technologies; tradable credits; credit price 
caps; exemptions for certain classes of retail electricity suppliers; and (except for the Coleman 
proposal) sunset provisions.  These provisions largely mirror policy devices found in one or 
more of the state RPS programs.  Significantly, the Federal programs would all allow tradability 
of RECs within the entire U.S., whereas most state policies contain significant state-wide or 
regional limitations on REC sources.  The Federal proposals have also tended to assume a 
replacement of the Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) with a National RPS, whereas state 
programs will operate with or without the Federal PTC. 
 
Though the various proposals have had common design elements, the specifics vary 
significantly.  For example, in the Coleman proposal, the qualifying technologies include nuclear 
power and fossil-fired plants that capture and sequester carbon dioxide emissions.  In the original 
Bingaman proposal, existing hydropower would not count toward meeting the requirement, but 
would reduce a retail supplier’s  renewable energy purchase obligation (by reducing the retail 
sales on which the RPS target applies).  The Coleman proposal has a 20% target, but electricity 
providers are never required to hold RECs in excess of total sales growth from a baseline period.  
A variety of other differences also exist among these proposed Federal RPS policies.   
 
B. Federal and State RPS Interactions 
 
As policymakers discuss the merits and design of Federal RPS proposals, one design element 
that will need to be addressed is how such a Federal standard might interact with the pre-existing 
state RPS policies.  The Bingaman proposal in the 109 PthP Congress contained provisions 
indicating that the Federal RPS would not pre-empt state RPS programs, and should coordinate 
                                                 
TP
23
PT See “Impacts of a 10-Percent Renewable Portfolio Standard” at 
HTUhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/rps/pdf/sroiaf(2002)03.pdfUTH.  
TP
24
PT See “Analysis of a 10 Percent Renewable Portfolio Standard” at 
HTUhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/rps2/index.htmlUTH, also bill H.R. 6, engrossed amendments as agreed to by the 
Senate (109 PthP Congress) at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
TP
25
PT See “Energy Market Impacts of a Clean Energy Portfolio Standard” at 
HTUhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/emice/index.htmlUTH.  Note that this proposal includes nuclear and coal with 
sequestration as well as renewable energy, so it may or may not strictly fall under the classification of an “RPS”, but 
it otherwise shares common RPS features.  Several state RPS programs include non-renewable resources as well. 
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to the extent practicable with such programs. TPF26FPT These provisions, however, did not explicitly 
address issues such as whether generation applied to a state target may also be applied to the 
Federal requirement, or if financial compliance mechanisms (alternative compliance payments, 
penalty payments, and so forth) at the state level are acceptable for Federal compliance.TPF27FPT  
Presumably, such issues could be addressed by regulation at the Federal level, based on the 
coordination direction in the proposal, but there is no specific guidance on such issues.  The 
more recent Coleman proposal, on the other hand, explicitly allows qualified state credits to 
count towards the Federal requirement.  It also has provisions allowing limited trade of excess 
state creditsTPF28FPT and allowing state financial compliance mechanisms to count towards the Federal 
requirement.TP PT 
 
These issues have not been addressed clearly in most state-level RPS policies.  Most states 
specifically address “double-counting” of credits, generally to disallow the same credits or 
generation from being used to satisfy more than one RPS requirement.  In many states, double-
counting restrictions are specified against another state’s program, but several states prohibit the 
practice with respect to any other jurisdiction. Whether these restrictions are intended to disallow 
an electricity provider from using its state RPS purchases towards a possible future Federal RPS 
is unclear.  In fact, it appears as if only Colorado has specifically addressed Federal RPS 
interactions, by allowing credits to count against both the Colorado target and any prospective 
Federal requirement.  Clearly, interactions between state RPS policies and a possible Federal 
RPS are one of the complicating features that must be addressed as Federal RPS policies are 
proposed, and as state policies develop.TPF29FPT  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
The popularity of state RPS policies has grown.  With twenty-two RPS policies now in existence 
in the U.S., covering 40% of the nation’s electrical load, the importance of these programs is 
expected to build over the coming decade.   
 
State RPS policies can and are designed in a variety of ways, and state RPS implementation 
experience in the U.S. has been mixed.  Comparative experience from states that have and have 
not achieved substantial renewable generation growth highlight the importance of design details 
in achieving stated policy objectives.  Policy advocates and policy makers might consider this 
state experience as debates over the possibility and design of a Federal RPS continue.  
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
26
PT For example, see “Analysis of a 10 Percent Renewable Portfolio Standard” at 
HTUhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/rps2/index.htmlUTH, also bill H.R. 6, engrossed amendments as agreed to by the 
Senate (109 PthP Congress) at http://thomas.loc.gov 
TP
27
PT Payments for not meeting state targets in excess of the Federal requirement would be allowed to count against any 
Federal compliance payments. 
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28
PT That is, in a state where the renewable share requirement exceeds the Federal share requirement, a company may 
assign “excess” credits to an affiliate in another state. 
TP
29
PT In the event that the Federal government passed an RPS with explicit language addressing the double-counting 
issue, there is always the possibility that state RPS statutes, as they affect Federal jurisdictions, would be rendered 
moot on constitutional grounds. 
